Red Herrings

The Boston Globe reports on a new White House official that will coordinate WMD non-proliferation efforts across myriad government agencies dealing with the threat. The position is timed with the publishing of a grim report from the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Wednesday, but it’s worth pointing out this position existed under Bush, he just refused to staff it for fear of subjecting it to Senate approval (thanks, George! Country first!). Anyway, this is all well and good, but it strikes me as sort of missing the point.

The 160-page report…calls for Obama to make it a top priority to stop nuclear weapons programs in Iran and North Korea, using diplomacy backed by credible threat of force; to beef up international efforts to slow the spread of nuclear weapons; and to work with Pakistan to eliminate terrorist safe havens and secure nuclear and biological materials in that country.

Without getting into the problems with “diplomacy backed by a credible threat of force”, it should be noted that Iran already exercises considerable influence not because of it’s conventional military but because of the power afforded by its de facto control of much of the region’s oil supply. So long as oil remains a key catalyst of the international economy, Iran will wield substantial power, nuke or not. North Korea has the capability to produce nuclear weapons (unlike Iran at the moment), but we don’t worry too much about North Korea because it’s incredibly poor and has little strategic importance. I understand the logic, and non-proliferation is quite important, but I feel it’s important not to miss the forest for the trees.

Lions, Tigers, and WMD, Oh Noes!

The Washington Post glosses the draft report of the Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, which warns that the likelihood of terrorists securing WMD has substantially increased, particularly from teetering states like Pakistan.

“Without greater urgency and decisive action by the world community, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013,” says the draft report, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Post.

The report concludes any such attack is very much a “preventable catastrophe”, and what I’m sure will be much to the chagrin of Charles Krauthammer and Bill Kristol, suggests strengthening international treaties and institutions as a preventative measure. In particular, the report recommends reengaging the Non-Proliferation Treaty reviled by the Bush Administration, cracking down on illicit trade, stopping weapons development, and rewarding good behavior by helping develop civilian nuclear programs on a quid pro quo basis.

This all seems to be right, though I think the report ought to be a bit more realistic about America’s bargaining position. That is, the U.S. should not only toughen the NPT, but should also reduce our needlessly enormous arsenal and abandon the faulty missile defense shield in Europe. What’s more, we’re simply in no state to be invading Iran unilaterally, nor would we want to invade North Korea, so posturing from a “position of strength” should be replaced with bargaining with good faith intentions of accomplishing something beneficial.

NoKo Up to Its Usual Tricks

So word comes from our friends at the I.A.E.A. that North Korea has barred inspectors from a reprocessing plant that produces materials for use in nuclear weapons and plans on starting up the machinery next week. The Bush Administration remains sanguine that multilateral talks will continue to yield the type of results that led NoKo to recently destroy its cooling tower. I hope so.

A quick word about North Korea: the reason NoKo is traditionally well positioned to extort the U.S. is that it’s population is ridiculously poor and ridiculously hungry. Therefore, while the U.S. — with assistance from South Korea and perhaps Japan — could easily topple the North Korean regime, the costs associated with habilitating the North Korean populace are staggering. As such, it’s been easier in the past to make concessions where we can. It’s sort of an odd paradox that a population that stands to benefit so greatly from regime change is precisely the reason regime change is infeasible.